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"WOULDA, COULDA, SHOULDA": A CONCEPTUAL EXAMINATION 
OF THE SOURCES OF POSTPURCHASE REGRET 
Neel Das and Anthony H. Kerr 
Regret is a key negative emotion consumers attempt to avoid while making decisions. Marketing researchers 
agree that, in addition to assessments of satisfaction, regret better explains postchoice valuation. Extant 
regret research in marketing literature has examined regret arising from the perspective of either the 
product choice or from the decision-making process that led to the purchase decision. This theoretical 
study examines the notion of regret arising simultaneously from both the product purchased and the 
decision-making process. A conceptual model is developed indicating two key moderators likely to impact 
the recognition and evaluation processes of the sources of regret. 
The conceptualization of the regret emotion states that 
individuals experience discomfort when they contemplate, 
postpurchase, that a forgone alternative might have led to 
a better situation (Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden 1982). For 
instance, a consumer may opt to purchase, for any given rea­
son or reasons, a convertible instead of a sedan, or purchase 
a more expensive brand-name product over a lesser-known 
inexpensive product. Regret is experienced postpurchase 
from the product chosen (when one contemplates that the 
sedan or the lesser-known inexpensive brand might have 
been a better option) or from the decision-making process 
(when one contemplates that the process leading one to 
choose a convertible or the more expensive brand-name 
product might have been suboptimal). 
Regret research in marketing literature has typically fo­
cused on the experience of the emotion arising from either 
the choice of the product purchased ( e.g., Tsiros and Mittal 
2000) or from the perspective of a decision action (e.g., 
Inman and Zeelenberg 2002). Given that regret results in 
a better assessment of postchoice valuation by consumers 
(Inman, Dyer, andJia 1997), should outcomes be appraised 
only in terms of the product choice or the decision? As 
most decision actions are "deliberate conscious accomplish­
ments" (Hastie and Dawes 2001, p. 26), it seems likely that 
they ought to be evaluated in terms of the determinants of 
what comprises a good decision-that is, how the decision 
is achieved and what is the result of the decision (Higgins 
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2000). We suggest that regret experienced by individuals 
is not solely a factor of the valence of the product choice 
(negative, when compared to a forgone product choice) 
or the valence of the decision-making process (negative, 
when compared to a forgone decision-making process) 
leading to the outcome. In other words, subsequent to an 
unfavorable outcome, regret experienced is a function of 
regret arising from both the chosen product (vis-a-vis the 
foregone product) and the decision-making process (vis-a­
vis the foregone decision-making process). 
Herein lies the overarching contribution of this concep­
tual study. We put forward the notion that there are two 
sources of the regret emotion experienced-regret arising 
from the decision-making process and regret arising from 
the product ( chosen as a result of the decision-making pro­
cess). The decision-making process is regrettable when one 
realizes in hindsight that the process adopted was subopti­
mal. A suboptimal decision-making process occurs when, 
for instance, information search regarding alternatives is 
conducted less intensively. Intensive search for evaluating 
alternatives is one of the criteria determining the quality 
of a decision process Ganis and Mann 1977, cited in Pieters 
and Zeelenberg 2005, p. 18). Alternatively, the product pur­
chased is regrettable when the consumer comes to know, 
postpurchase, about the existence of a better-performing 
product (compared to the chosen product) in the market­
place/space. The assumption, in terms of regret arising 
from the product purchased, is that a consumer does not 
knowingly forgo a better-performing product. 
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We believe that such an investigation of the regret con­
struct is likely to help researchers and practitioners better 
understand the emotion. Consumers do not always make 
correct attributions, subsequent to an unfavorable outcome. 
For instance, when the product purchased fails to perform, 
one may mistakenly blame one's decision-making process 
for such an unfavorable outcome, even though such a pro­
cess leading to the purchase might have been optimal. On 
the other hand, when one adopts a suboptimal decision­
making process, one may end up regretting the product 
purchased and blame the marketer thereof. Such misattri­
butions are likely to shadow the functionality of the regret 
emotion, prevent individuals from properly regulating their 
regret, and may cause marketers to lose customers. Specifi­
cally, although regret makes one's mistakes more salient, it 
also helps to prevent one from making the same mistake in 
the future and acts as a catalyst to undo the cause of regret 
(Zeelenberg 1999). Such functionality from the negative 
emotion, however, can only be obtained when one makes 
correct attributions subsequent to the failure of the decision 
action. Following the experience of regret, individuals also 
try to perform behaviors that may ameliorate the feelings 
encountered (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007); however, such 
behaviors can only be successful in blotting the pain if 
such individuals take the right actions based on the correct 
attributions. Finally, if marketers become aware of such 
misattributions on the part of the consumer, they may 
communicate and clarify the roles that consumers need to 
play in the consumption delivery and administration of a 
product (Soscia 2007). 
In summary, in this conceptual research we ask and try 
to answer the following questions: Is it likely that when one 
is experiencing regret, there could indeed be two sources 
of the regret emotion occurring simultaneously and one 
may not be cognitively aware of such a distinction? Could 
there be situations where one may regret the product choice 
more than the decision-making process or vice versa? What 
could lead one to make a distinction between regret ema­
nating from an unfavorable product choice and that from 
an unfavorable decision-making process? Finally, what 
might be some of the possible practical and managerial 
implications originating from the distinction between the 
two sources of regret? 
THE REGRET EMOTION 
Regret is a painful negative feeling arising as a consequence 
of decision making when one appears to have made a wrong 
decision, even if it appeared to be the right decision at the 
time it was made (Loomes and Sugden 1982). In other words, 
regret arises when one compares "what is" with "what might 
have been" (Sugden 1985) or when an individual realizes 
that the outcome of the rejected option might have been 
better (Zeelenberg 1999). Hence, an essential element of 
the regret emotion is the realization that a different choice 
would have led to a better outcome. Zeelenberg and Pieters 
further suggest that regret is a cognitive emotion, in that 
it "contains all the elements typical of emotional experi­
ences" (2007, p. 6) such as a sinking feeling, thoughts about 
opportunities lost, and thoughts about mistakes made by 
one and the desire to correct them, if given a chance. 
Given the definition of the regret emotion, how is it dif­
ferent from disappointment? Both regret and disappoint­
ment are experienced when there is disconfirmation between 
what has happened and what could have happened. In the 
case of regret, the comparison is between the perceived 
performance of the chosen option and the perceived per­
formance of a foregone alternative, whereas for disappoint­
ment, the comparison is between the expectations and the 
perceived performance level of the one chosen alternative 
(Zeelenberg et al. 2000). In other words, the reference point 
for regret is external ( encompassing both the chosen option 
and the foregone alternatives), whereas that for disappoint­
ment is internal (encompassing only the chosen option). It 
is also suggested that disappointment generally leaves one 
powerless with a tendency to want to get away from every­
thing and not wanting to do or have any association with 
the outcome (Zeelenberg et al. 1998). Regret, on the other 
hand, involves feelings of responsibility and results in not 
being able to get away from such an experience. 
TWO SOURCES OF REGRET 
Given that regret is experienced as a result of a compari­
son between what is and what might have been, it seems 
likely that regret may arise as a result of an unfavorable 
decision-making process or an unfavorable product choice. 
The important notion to appreciate is that an unfavorable 
decision-making process is separate from an unfavorable 
product choice, and individuals may experience regret from 
either one or both. Below are three different scenarios to 
underline the notion of how regret may arise separately or 
in unison from the sources. 
Scenario 1. Sugden (1985) puts forth the following vi­
gnette that shows regret may arise from the decision-making 
source, although the outcome is satisfactory: suppose one is 
inebriated after a party and decides to drive back home in 
an impaired condition. He or she does reach home safely. 
However, the next morning he or she starts to think of what 
might/could have happened while driving on his or her way 
back home. In this instance, the decision-making process 
involves the element of determining to drive back home 
in an intoxicated condition and the result of such a deci­
sion is the fact that the person reaches home (fortunately) 
without any untoward incident. Based on our definitions 
of a regrettable decision-making process and a regrettable 
product (outcome, in this scenario) as provided earlier, it 
seems evident that a decision choice to drink and drive is 
likely to be more regrettable rather than the fact of reach­
ing home safely. 
Scenario 2. Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002) illustrate a 
situation when the regret arises from the outcome, although 
the decision-making process is satisfactory. A decision to 
vaccinate one's child against a serious disease is likely to 
result in regret from the outcome when the child suffers a 
bad side effect. Although the decision to vaccinate might 
have been a carefully executed one, the outcome is regret­
table. Here the decision-making process is likely to involve, 
among other things, elements such as researching carefully 
the pros and cons of the vaccination, securing a second ( or 
even multiple) opinion(s) from experts, deciding on a good 
physician, and so on. The product received is the vaccination 
for the child. Assuming a prudent decision-making process, 
the product is likely to be regretted when the child suffers 
from the deleterious side effect. 
Scenario 3. Consider a situation in which a consumer 
decides to buy a particular brand of a digital camera 
even though the salesperson recommends another brand. 
Subsequently, the individual comes across the ratings of 
Consumer Reports regarding the purchased brand and the 
recommended brand. Much to the consumer's dismay, the 
overall rating of the purchased brand is much lower than 
the recommended brand. The decision-making process now 
involves elements such as recognizing the correct need for 
the type of camera, deciding on a store to get the product 
from, identifying a competent salesperson, and assessing 
the information received, among other things. It is quite 
usual that individuals are likely to listen to experts (sales­
person, in this case) in order to minimize risks (Grewal, 
Gotlieb, and Marmorstein 1994). The product received is 
the brand purchased ( different from the recommendation 
of the salesperson). In such a situation, the consumer is 
likely to regret both his or her decision-making process (of 
not listening to the salesperson's recommendation) and the 
opportunity to own a better product. 
The above scenarios attempt to underline the notion 
that the experience of regret may arise from the decision-
making process, or from the product choice, or from the 
decision-making process and the product choice. Hence, an 
individual needs to be aware of the sources of regret in order 
to understand what has happened. A significant reason as 
to why one needs to understand the experience of the emo­
tion is because of the functionality or learning mechanism 
associated with the emotion. Given the aversive and salient 
nature of the emotion (Zeelenberg 1999), individuals are 
likely to learn from their mistakes and alter their behavior 
in subsequent similar situations. However, if the individual 
does not correctly ascertain the source of regret, then the 
functionality of regret is likely to be absent. 
As noted previously, extant regret research in marketing 
has primarily investigated the occurrence of regret arising 
from a product choice or from a decision-making perspec­
tive. There has been no investigation of the emotion arising 
from both the product choice as well as the decision-making 
process in the same study. Tsiros and Mittal (2000), for 
instance, studied the experience of regret arising from a 
product choice without taking into account the decision­
making perspective. The results of their studies essentially 
showed that regret arises from the existence of a better­
performing foregone alternative. Inman and Zeelenberg 
(2002), on the other hand, studied regret emanating from 
a decision-making perspective, without looking at the 
performance of the product chosen. Specifically, they inves­
tigated regret arising from a decision to do things as they 
were done in the past (i.e., maintaining status quo) versus 
a decision to do things differently in the future (i.e., switch 
brands or stores). For instance, buying the same brand over 
subsequent purchase decisions versus switching to a new 
brand in a subsequent buying decision. The results from 
their study showed that, contrary to prior findings, when 
there is a justifiable reason for a switch to occur, maintain­
ing status quo results in greater regret. 
Researchers in psychology, however, have introduced 
the notion of the sources of regret in their domain. Pieters 
and Zeelenberg (2005) have looked at the sources of regret 
in the context of intention-behavior inconsistency. Their 
basic premise was that when individuals make a decision 
that was not originally intended, they are likely to regret 
that unintended decision, regardless of the outcome from 
such a decision. In a series of three different research 
contexts (a scenario approach, assessing autobiographical 
memories of regrettable events, and a longitudinal study 
relating to real-life voting in national elections), Pieters 
and Zeelenberg found that a bad inconsistent decision 
process amplified regret, independent of the outcome. We 
contend that if a conceptualization of regret, emanating 
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from both the product and the decision-making process, is 
introduced in the context of a consumer purchase decision, 
marketing researchers and practitioners alike are likely to 
better understand the phenomenon and the consequences 
of the same. 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Figure 1 represents the conceptual model for the regret 
process discussed in this paper. Regret can arise from 
product choice or the decision-making process due to the 
diagnosticity of the negative postpurchase information 
regarding such source(s). In this study's context, diag­
nosticity refers to the negative postpurchase information 
receiving more weight when assessing or judging how an 
alternative foregone product option or the decision-making 
process might have resulted in a better outcome. However, 
not all individuals are likely to be motivated to process the 
negative postpurchase information regarding the sources 
separately, thereby disenabling them to distinguish between 
the sources of regret. The propensity to do so depends on 
the motivation of the consumer to think about what went 
wrong and how. Although several variables may indicate 
when consumers make the distinction between the sources 
of regret, we feel that two such variables need to be a part 
of this discussion-need for cognition and regulatory fit. 
Before we discuss the moderating effects of each, we present 
a short argument underlining the need for their inclusion 
in the present model. 
As mentioned earlier, the experience of regret requires 
running a mental recreation of what happened and what 
could have happened and subsequently comparing the 
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two. However, such simulations are only likely to be con­
ducted when one enjoys and engages in such cognitive 
activities-the characteristic of need for cognition. Hence, 
it is necessary to include need for cognition as an integral 
part of this conceptual model. Regulatory fit, a goal-pursuit 
theory, aligns the relationship between motivation of the 
individual and the manner in which he or she engages in 
the goal; such fit dictates a preference for certain strategies 
(to accomplish the goal) (Cesario, Higgins, and Scholer 
2008). Furthermore, there is a notion of "feeling right" 
when such strategies are used which are then transferred 
to subsequent evaluations (Avnet and Higgins 2006). For 
instance, prior research indicates that individuals place a 
higher monetary value to objects when their choice strategy 
fits their regulatory orientation as compared to when it 
does not (Avnet and Higgins 2006). In terms of this current 
research, when individuals are engaged in a decision-making 
process, they are likely to go through the process and 
consequently assess their decision making based on their 
regulatory orientations. Hence, it is necessary to include 
regulatory fit for a better understanding of our conceptual 
model. Next we discuss the moderating variables and their 
influence in detail. 
Need for Cognition 
Enjoyment of and motivation to engage in effortful cogni­
tive information processing is conceptualized as an indi­
vidual's need for cognition (Cacioppo and Petty 1982). Need 
for cognition is an important individual difference variable 
that determines variations in consumer evaluations. Past 
research has examined its effect, inter alia, on variations in 
consumer attitude (Areni, Ferrell, and Wilcox 2000; Martin, 
Lang, and Wong 2004; Underwood and Shaughnessy 1975), 
consumer involvement (Andrews, Durvasula, and Akhtar 
1990), message framing (Zhang and Buda 1999), price ac­
ceptability (Suri and Monroe 2001), and mental accounting 
(Chatterjee et al. 2000). 
In terms of this research effort, we intend to posit the 
effects of need for cognition in terms of evaluating a deci­
sion action and the resultant outcome. Any action relating 
to a decision may be viewed as a short-term perspective, 
beginning from the initiation of and ending at the comple­
tion of the decision-making process. Alternatively, actions 
relating to decisions can involve a long-term motivational 
perspective composed of four distinct sequential phases 
(Heckhausen and Gollwitzer 1986). The initial or predeci­
sional phase involves the identification of different goals 
constituted of the various wants, needs, and desires of 
individuals. The second phase, or postdecisional phase, 
comes into effect when the individual makes a decision to 
engage in one of these goals and selects strategies regarding 
the implementation of the same. A transition is made to 
the third phase, or actional phase, whereby individuals act 
on the strategies identified in the previous, postdecisional 
phase. Upon reaching an outcome resulting from these 
strategies, individuals enter the postactional phase when 
they evaluate the outcome. 
Extant research (Gollwitzer 1990; Gollwitzer and Kinney 
1989) has posited that in effect, each phase motivates an in­
dividual to be tuned-in and ready for any given specific task 
necessary for the successful implementation of the same. 
For instance, the predecisional phase gears a person's mind 
toward the expected values of potential goals and hence the 
person is likely to spend time thinking about the potential 
attractiveness of the different goals. In the postdecisional 
phase, the person is more involved in the determination 
of the appropriate strategy to use to attain the chosen goal 
and, therefore, thinks in terms of when, where, and how. 
Similarly, in the final postactional phase, the person is more 
likely to think in terms of the results of the implemented 
strategy (completed during the actional phase) and deter­
mine whether the outcome achieves the desired goal as set 
forth in the initial or predecisional phase. If the goal is not 
achieved with the final outcome (derived in the postactional 
phase), then one is likely to ponder each of the different 
phases and try and find out what went wrong. 
Using this past research as our basis, it is our contention 
that only highly involved consumers are likely to adopt a 
long-term motivational perspective in terms of decision 
making. In contrast, consumers with low involvement are 
likely to take a short-term decision-making perspective and 
not separate an action relating to a decision into separate 
phases. In other words, highly involved consumers are 
more likely to separate the source(s) of regret, whereas 
less-involved consumers would simply recognize that the 
regret emotion exists without distinguishing the particular 
source(s) of the emotion. 
Furthermore, regret is viewed as a cognitive emotion. In 
order to understand whether one experiences regret or not, 
one has to involve him- or herself in a cognitive process 
(Landman 1993; Zeelenberg 1999). Hence, regret results in 
a sufficient degree of cognitive appraisal. In the context of 
this research, such a cognitive appraisal may be the means 
to understanding the cause(s) of regret experienced. Spe­
cifically, the distinction between the two types of regret 
is likely to be apparent for individuals with a high need 
for cognition. High need for cognition individuals have a 
greater tendency to think elaborately on relevant informa­
tion, compared to low need for cognition individuals. The 
latter group consists of individuals who are usually cogni­
tive misers (Tidwell, Sadowski, and Pate 2000). Whereas 
high need for cognition individuals think more actively 
about their options, low need for cognition individuals do 
not (Simon, Fagley, and Halleran 2004). In other words, 
those who are apt and more motivated to cognitively 
appraise a negatively disconfirmed transaction are more 
likely to attempt to decipher as to what and how some­
thing went wrong. On the other hand, those who are not 
likely to cognitively appraise a transaction, subsequently, 
are unlikely to attempt to decipher or identify any specific 
source of regret. 
Based on the above discussion, we propose: 
Proposition 1: Need for cognition will likely influence 
individual mental processing of negative postpurchase 
information. Specifically, high need for cognition indi­
viduals are more likely to separate the sources of regret 
experienced-that is, product versus decision-making 
process-than low need for cognition individuals. 
Regulatory Fit 
How individuals arrive at their desired goals depends on 
their unique orientations regarding how they make deci­
sions (e.g., Aaker and Lee 2001; Higgins 1997, 2000). Such 
orientations may relate to the quest to acquire a positive 
outcome or to prevent a negative outcome. Regulatory focus 
theory (Higgins 1997) states that people have a promotion 
orientation when they try to acquire a positive outcome 
(e.g., Aaker and Lee 2001; Higgins 2000), and thereby 
maintain a sense of advancement and accomplishment 
(Roese, Hur, and Pennington 1999). On the other hand, 
people have a prevention orientation when they try and 
eschew a negative outcome (e.g., Aaker and Lee 2001) and 
hence garner more security and protection (Roese, Hur, 
and Pennington 1999). 
Regulatory focus further identifies different ways and 
means of goal achievement. Eagerness means and vigilance 
means specify the achievement of goals under promotion 
and prevention orientations, respectively (Crowe and Hig­
gins 1997; Higgins 2000, 2002). Eagerness refers to attempts 
to maximize the presence of positive outcomes and thereby 
guarantee aspiration and accomplishments, whereas vigi­
lance refers to attempts to minimize the presence of nega­
tive outcomes and thereby ensure safety and protection 
(Higgins 2000; Higgins and Spiegel 2004). Therefore, pro­
motion-oriented individuals use eagerness means, whereas 
prevention-oriented individuals use vigilance means to 
make decisions. For example, consider two recent business 
school graduates with high-paying jobs looking to buy a car. 
One considers a top-notch convertible in order to underline 
his or her accomplishments and status. The other considers 
a top-of-the-line minivan proven to be reliable and safe. 
Although both graduates demand the same product, their 
respective regulatory focus drives them to have "distinct 
patterns of attention, reasoning, and memory, possibly 
involving different neuroanatomical systems" (Gray 1994 
quoted in Roese, Hur, and Pennington 1999, p. 1110) and 
subsequently resulting in different choices. 
The important notion to understand is that no matter 
what the regulatory focus is for a certain individual, there 
is a sense of "feeling right" when decisions are made ac­
cording to one's regulatory orientation (e.g., Aaker and 
Lee 2006; Cesario, Higgins, and Scholer 2008). This sense 
of "feeling right" emanates from situations involving a 
regulatory fit between an individual's existing orientation 
and the strategies used to make a choice. In other words, 
regulatory fit is experienced when an individual pursues a 
goal that sustains his or her regulatory orientation (Avnet 
and Higgins 2003). The fit emphasizes the fact that the 
individual used the correct strategy to make a choice and 
also increases the importance of his or her action (Hig­
gins 2002). Overall, regulatory fit is likely to increase, and 
nonfit is likely to decrease, the value of a decision (Avnet 
and Higgins 2003). There are several implications of the 
occurrence of fit. Extant findings indicate that the presence 
of a fit results in, inter alia, an individual's willingness to 
pay more for a product, having a more positive attitude 
toward a product, and being more confident in one's judg­
ment (Aaker and Lee 2006). 
Wang and Lee (2006) mention certain boundary con­
ditions for the fit effect. In their study, it was found that 
individuals do search for more information and spend more 
time processing information when they were otherwise not 
motivated to process such information. On the other hand, 
individuals who were otherwise highly motivated to process 
product information did not indicate any regulatory focus 
effect in the product evaluations. Perhaps the notion of a 
regulatory fit is used as a heuristic for making decisions 
when the involvement is low. When individuals are highly 
motivated to process product information, they are more 
likely to proceed along a systematic decision-making, 
information-gathering continuum, regardless of promotion 
or prevention concerns. 
In the context of our current study, we utilize the concept 
of regulatory fit to further elucidate our conceptualization 
of the regret emotion. Given our definitions for a regret­
table decision-making process and a product, we posit that 
when one's decision-making process is regrettable (solely 
or in conjunction with the product), regulatory fit is going 
to have an effect. Fit is not likely to play a role when the 
product is solely regrettable. Regulatory fit relates to one's 
decision and regulatory orientation, and "the regulatory fit 
value from how a decision is made is independent of the 
outcome value" (Avnet and Higgins 2003, p. 525, emphasis 
in original). This effect is also likely to be a function of 
the need for cognition. Evans and Petty (2003) concluded 
that need for cognition moderates the effects of regula­
tory fit. The results of their study indicate that individu­
als' evaluations of a product are affected by the message 
quality (weak versus strong arguments). This is especially 
prevalent when the message is framed with a promotion­
or prevention-focused appeal, but only in the case of low 
need for cognition individuals. In the case of high need 
for cognition individuals, evaluations of a product are af­
fected by message quality (weak versus strong arguments), 
regardless of regulatory fit. Wang and Lee (2006) also found 
similar results while investigating the boundary conditions 
of regulatory fit, as stated in the above paragraph. 
Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that high 
need for cognition individuals are not likely to be affected 
by regulatory fit when the postpurchase diagnostic infor­
mation relates to either the product or both the product 
and the decision-making process. Low need for cognition 
individuals, on the other hand, are likely to be affected by 
regulatory fit when the postpurchase diagnostic informa­
tion relates to either the product, the decision-making pro­
cess, or both the product and the decision-making process. 
Hence, the following proposition is introduced: 
Proposition 2: Neither the presence nor absence of regu­
latory fit will likely affect to any significant degree the 
level at which an individual experiences postpurchase 
regret when the negative postpurchase disconfirmation 
information relates to only the product or to both the 
product and the decision-making process. In contrast, 
the presence or absence of regulatory fit will likely af fect 
to a significant degree the level at which an individual 
experiences postpurchase regret when the postpurchase 
diagnostic information relates to only the decision­
making process. 
We further propose that need for cognition (in addition 
to the interactions posited above) is also going to have an 
effect on the regret experienced. We therefore propose the 
following interaction between the negative postpurchase 
disconfirmation information, need for cognition, and 
regulatory fit: 
Proposition 3: The influence of the presence of regulatory 
fit on the degree to which one experiences postpurchase 
regret (relating only to the decision-making process) will 
likely differ among high need for cognition and low need 
for cognition individuals. Specifically, among high need 
for cognition individuals, neither the presence nor the 
absence of regulatory fit will likely significantly influ­
ence the degree to which one experiences postpurchase 
regret when the diagnostic information relates to only 
the decision-making process. In contrast, among low 
need for cognition individuals, the degree to which 
one experiences postpurchase regret will likely be lower 
(higher) when regulatory fit is present ( absent) and when 
the diagnostic information relates to only the decision­
making process. 
Attitude Toward the Retailer or the 
Product Purchased 
The model also indicates that the level of regret experienced 
will likely affect the attitude of individuals regarding the 
product purchased or the retailer. Attitudes that may be 
exhibited include, inter alia, intentions to switch and com­
plaint about the product purchased or the retailer. 
Switching refers to abandoning a relationship with a 
retailer or a manufacturer ( of a particular product) and 
beginning a new relationship with a different retailer or 
manufacturer (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2004). Prior research 
suggests that switching is a direct response to regret; that 
is, the greater the regret, the more there is the tendency to 
switch (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2004) and, subsequently, 
lower the tendency toward repurchase intentions (Tsiros 
and Mittal 2000). 
Kowalski (1996) describes consumer complaint behavior 
as behavioral expressions of dissatisfaction or unfavorable 
attitudes directed toward an individual, a situation, or an 
object. Using the disconfirmation paradigm as his basis, 
Kowalski expressed that complaint behavior reflects dis­
satisfaction from an exchange generated from a negative 
disconfirmation of expectancies. Extant regret research 
in marketing has found no effect of regret on consumer 
complaint intentions (Tsiros and Mittal 2000). Research 
has shown that although satisfaction affects complaint in­
tentions, the effects of regret are mediated via satisfaction 
(Tsiros and Mittal 2000). Essentially, one may be satisfied 
with the product but may experience regret when a fore­
gone alternative is perceived to perform better than the 
chosen product. In such a situation, it is not likely for one 
to complain to the manufacturer ( of the chosen product) 
about another product that is perceived to outperform the 
chosen one. Switching to a better-performing product in 
the future is the likely outcome. 
We suggest that when trying to understand the attitudes 
of the individual toward the product purchased or the re­
tailer, the notion of responsibility for the decision action 
becomes a key issue. Responsibility is an important pre­
condition for regret. The more responsible one feels for the 
decision action, the more regret one is likely to experience 
subsequent to an unfavorable result (Zeelenberg et al. 1998; 
2000). Tsiros, Mittal, and Ross (2004) suggest that respon­
sibility incorporates two aspects-who caused the failure 
and the amount of control one had over a decision. Hence, 
when one feels responsible for the unfavorable outcome, a 
sense of guilt may attenuate the intentions of switching and 
increase the same for repurchase intentions. On the other 
hand, when one feels less responsible for the unfavorable 
outcome, and if such an outcome is attributed to, say, a 
faulty recommendation from a salesperson (perceived to be 
an expert), one may express intentions to complain. While 
responsibility is likely to drive the feelings of regret, it may 
also help consumers adjust their behavioral intentions 
accordingly. Probable boundary conditions, vis-a-vis the 
extant research findings, may emerge as explained below. 
When the decision-making process is regrettable, bound­
ary conditions for switching and repurchase intentions 
may originate. Specifically, the attribution is likely to be 
internal (to the individual), and less unfavorable attitudes 
are likely to be formed toward the retailer or the product 
purchased. Corollarily, when one's decision is well thought 
out, but the product choice fails to deliver, one is likely to 
have unfavorable attitudes toward the product. Moreover, 
if the product choice was due to a salesperson's 
recommenda­tion (where listening to the salesperson was 
deemed to be a part of an optimal decision-making 
process), unfavorable attitude is also likely to be 
associated with the retailer. Spe­cifically, complaint 
intentions may be exhibited toward the retailer who 
recommended the suboptimal product. Finally, when both 
sources of regret are at work, both internal and external 
attributions are made for the unfavorable outcome. 
However, whether this situation will be any different from 
the one where regret is experienced due to an 
unfavorable product choice is debatable. We posit that 
when regret experienced is attributed primarily due to 
the unfavorable product choice, the attitude formation 
toward the retailer and the product is likely to be more 
negative than when regret is attributed to both one's 
decision-making process and the unfavorable product 
choice. In the former situa­tion, when one knows that 
he or she is not to be blamed for what has happened, 
one is likely to vent out more on the external party (i.e., 
product and retailer). Alternatively, in the latter 
situation, when regret is attributed to both one's 
decision-making process and the unfavorable product 
choice, then one could be relatively more forgiving 
toward the external party (i.e., product and retailer). 
Given the discussion above, the following proposition 
is presented: 
Proposition 4: Consumer attitudes toward the retailer and 
the product purchased will likely be more unfavorable when 
the negative postpurchase disconfirmation infor­mation 
pertains only to the product choice versus when the negative 
postpurchase disconfirmation information pertains to either 
the decision-making process or to both the product choice 
and the decision-making process. 
DISCUSSION 
Campbell Soup Company ran an advertisement for its VS 
vegetable soup stating, "WOW, I could have had a VS." 
In doing so, the company probably tried to make their 
con­sumers realize that their decision to buy another 
brand would result in an unfavorable experience 
compared to the VS brand. The point to note is that the 
company wanted the consumers to realize that their 
decision could have enabled them to get a better 
product. In other words, the headline in the 
advertisement probably acted as a catalyst for the 
consumers to think about the decision they made 
regarding the chosen product. This example underlines 
the key objective of this research. 
The objective of this research was to initially introduce 
the notion of regret arising from two different sources­
the decision-making process adopted and the product 
choice as a result of the decision-making process-and 
subsequently illustrate how individuals may misattribute 
the source of regret when both the sources of regret are 
measured. Although extant regret research in marketing 
has investigated regret arising from the product or from 
the decision-making source, no study has looked at the 
simultaneous assessment of the sources. Regret research 
in psychology has introduced the notion in their domain 
by examining decision inconsistency. In this research, we 
propose factors other than decision inconsistency in order 
to have the segregation of the sources of regret. Hence, if 
individuals understand what it is they are regretting when 
they experience the emotion, it will be helpful for them to 
regulate or ameliorate the feelings arising thereof. 
By investigating the regret emotion in this way, we 
hope to add to the burgeoning field of regret-related and 
decision-making research. In terms of decision-making 
research, for instance, Zhang and Mittal (2005) looked 
into the effects of procedural and outcome accountability 
in the context of consumer decisions and found that under 
certain conditions, perceived decision difficulty is assuaged 
for procedural accountability and enhanced for decision 
accountability. Our current research tends to supplement 
this work in the realm of a postpurchase emotional context. 
Regret arising from the decision-making process may be 
looked upon as an outcome of procedural accountability, 
and that arising from the product choice a result of outcome 
accountability. 
THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
The suggestions in this conceptual paper could have several 
implications for research and practice. By separating the ex­
perience of the regret construct as we proposed, it allows us 
to better understand its consequences or outcomes in a con­
sumer decision context. In terms of behavioral intentions, 
Tsiros and Mittal (2000) found an inverse relationship be­
tween regret and repurchase intentions, and Zeelenberg and 
Pieters (2004) found a direct relationship with switching 
intentions. In other words, the greater the intensity of the 
regret experienced, the lesser the likelihood of repurchasing 
the product and the greater the likelihood of switching to 
a different product in the future. Neither Tsiros and Mittal 
(2000) nor Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004) found any effects 
of regret on complaint intentions. However, we propose a 
likely boundary condition to the above-mentioned findings. 
When the attribution for an unfavorable outcome is internal 
to the consumer (when one's decision-making process is 
the source of regret), the chances of exhibiting behavioral 
consequences, such as switching, are likely to be lower than 
when the attribution is external (product choice). Moreover, 
when the attribution is external, complaint intentions are 
also likely to arise because the consumer may want to talk 
about his or her bad experience to the retailer, company, or 
to others. Hence, behavioral intentions may not be affected 
as postulated by previous research when both sources of 
regret are examined. 
Probable managerial implications that emanate from this 
discussion should focus on the reduction of negative con­
sumer behavioral intentions possibly stemming from either 
one of the sources of postpurchase regret. Marketers may 
benefit if they can make the consumers' role more salient or 
participatory in the purchase, delivery, and consumption of 
a product. In such a way, attributions are facilitated so that 
consumers are not as likely to make misdirected attributions 
that would otherwise prove harmful or damaging to the 
marketer. For instance, some hotels allow self-registration 
for guests on their arrival, whereby a guest has the oppor­
tunity to select his or her room; while purchasing airline 
tickets online, a consumer has the opportunity to select his 
or her seat. In regard to averting misdirected attributions, 
the above examples depict participatory consumer involve­
ment, whereby subsequent to a bad room choice by a hotel 
guest or a bad seat selection by a passenger, one can only 
blame him- or herself and not direct the blame externally 
to the marketer. On the flip side, when consumers do not 
experience regret from either their decision-making process 
or the product (say, when elation occurs), the segregation 
of the sources and its proper attribution may also help 
the generation of positive word-of-mouth regarding the 
product/retailer. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
In addition to empirically testing the propositions devel­
oped and presented in this paper, future research efforts 
may also discover additional moderating influences that 
would help anticipate the effects of the two sources of regret 
on postpurchase behavior. A continuation of the study and 
analysis of the roles of attribution theory and complaint 
behavior, as they relate to regret behavior, would also be 
of interest. The opportunities to contribute to the regret 
stream of marketing literature, from refining and clarifying 
the sources of regret, to determining the behavioral impact 
that each source of regret may have on postpurchase at­
titudes and outcomes, are plentiful. 
CONCLUSION 
This conceptual presentation was developed and explored 
with the objective of explaining two sources of the post­
purchase regret emotion arising simultaneously. The model 
introduced two key moderating influences believed to affect 
the cognitive recognition and evaluative processes of these 
sources of regret and their subsequent attitudinal effects 
on postpurchase behavioral outcomes. Future research 
possibilities emerging from this research include, inter 
alia, the empirical analysis of the propositions offered. 
Additional scrutiny regarding other moderating influences 
on the differentiation of the sources of regret is also likely 
to contribute to this area of consumer research. 
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